Will Israel "recklessly" seize the day? "Have the doors to a war without limits been opened?" by Alastair Crooke
(2024-09-24 at 00:25:21 )

Will Israel "recklessly" seize the day? "Have the doors to a war without limits been opened?" by Alastair Crooke

Judging by Israeli statements, the consensus is that Hizbullah will retaliate, but in a way that is different from the way it has responded until now.

"After today [the day of the pager simultaneous explosions], there can be no talk about settlement and solutions", writes Ibrahim Amine, Editor of Al-Akhbar, known for his close contacts with the Hizbullah leadership:

"In just one minute, the enemy succeeded in delivering its harshest blows to the body of the Islamic Resistance - [Furthermore] through yesterdays operation, the enemy confirmed that it does not want to abide by the rules of engagement. Have the doors to a war [then] been opened: a war without any limits, ceilings, or borders"?

"After today, it [i.e. the Israeli enemy] will make no distinction between a fighter operating on the front and an individual working in some distant office", Amine noted.

For the last year, both Israel and Hizbullah have avoided major escalation by observing unwritten rules of engagement or "equations" between the parties, such as not targeting civilians. That is now over.

In his first speech since the devices blew up on Tuesday and Wednesday, Sayed Nasrallah, the Hizbullah leader, conceded that his group had "endured a severe and cruel blow". He accused Israel of breaking "all conventions and laws" and said that it would "face just retribution and a bitter reckoning". But he did not describe how Hezbollah might retaliate; "nor did he discuss the time, nor manner, nor place" of it ocurring.

Nasrallah warned:

"The enemy declares as its official goal to return the settlers to the North. We accept the challenge: You will not be able to return to the North. In fact, we will displace more Israelis from their homes. We hope Israel enters Lebanon, we are waiting for their tanks day and night: We say, "welcome!"".

There is some point to this remark. From the outset, Hizbullah was configured militarily more for all-out war with Israel, than the limited tit-for-tat, calibrated war - which never played best to Hizbullahs strengths.

Clearly, a new phase of war has begun, and to underline this point, Israel began one of its heaviest strikes on Israel after Nasrallahs speech on Thursday night. United States Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin reportedly informed leaders of Congress that evening about his fear of an imminent Israeli offensive into Lebanon.

Nasrallahs assessment of coming war is fully shared by at least some senior Israeli military commanders, albeit by no means all. Several profess the belief that war with Hizbullah could extend into a regional war - and lead to the collapse of Israel.

However - "You do not do something like that, hit thousands of people, and think war is not coming", said retired Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi, who leads the Israel Defence and Security Forum, a group of hawkish former military commanders. "Why did we not do it for 11 months? Because we were not willing to go to war yet. What is happening now? Israel is ready for war".

"There is a lot of pressure from the society to go to war and win", said Avivi, the retired general. "Unless Hezbollah tomorrow morning says, "OK, we got the message. We are pulling out of south Lebanon" - war is imminent".

A poll in late August by the Israel Democracy Institute, a Jerusalem think tank, found that 67% of Jewish respondents thought Israel should intensify its response to Hizbullah. That includes 46% who believed that Israel should launch a deep offensive striking Lebanese infrastructure, and 21% who seek an intensified response that only strikes on Hezbollahs infrastructure.

General Avivis remarks likely reflect an underlying reality that had become only too clear: Amos Hochstein, the United States Envoy, has failed to achieve any "diplomatic" progress towards a Hizbullah withdrawal from the south of Lebanon. In parallel, United States officials, (according to the WSJ) now concede that a Gaza ceasefire is "out of reach" for Biden; and that, equally, Israels military attrition on southern Lebanon that had resulted in the displacement of 80% of its inhabitants had achieved nothing. Israels northern residents also remain displaced.

It seems, therefore, that Israel is set on a path to wider conflict. A taster has already been given: On 17 September, the Houthis fired a missile at a target close to Ben Gurion airport. The missile covered 1,300 miles in less than 12 min, which is to say, it flew at hypersonic speed, approaching Mach 9 - untouchable by air defences - and struck its target.

It is probable that we shall see more such hypersonic missiles flying - immune to air defences - should this war escalate, and Iran intervene.

What is paradoxical (as so often in conflict) is that the exploding pager operation seemingly was entirely fortuitous in terms of the timing. It was not planned specifically to move Israel to a new phase in the Lebanese conflict:

"High-level regional intelligence sources told Al-Monitor that the decision to carry out the operation was "forced" on Israel following an intelligence lapse - The Israeli militarys original plan was to explode the devices in the event of a full-blown war with Hezbollah in order to gain a strategic edge - but not to detonate them on Tuesday", the sources added.

"However suspicions from at least two Hezbollah members caused the Israeli security establishment to agree to a premature execution of the plan. After a Hezbollah member in Lebanon suspected foul play with the pagers several days ago - that person was killed, the sources said - [and the plan was] ultimately executed. The subsequent decision to trigger the radios to explode was said to be driven by the expectation that after the pager detonations the radios would fall under suspicion".

With the weather due to change within a few weeks, curtailing - or even halting - air operations, Israel was faced with having to chose between two alternative courses: Military action within weeks, or to wait until next Spring to exert more pressure on Hizbullah to shift its stance. The political future in Israel going into next year however, is extremely opaque. (Netayahus court appearances are due to resume in December).

The Hizbullah members unforeseen suspicions about the pagers "cast the die" - taking us to a new level of war.

Unsurprisingly, the chatter in Israel is that the pager operation has resulted in a major blow to Hizbullahs communication system that will cripple the movements military capability, offering Israel the "window" to press home an invasion to establish a "buffer zone" in southern Lebanon - one that might facilitate the return of Israeli residents to the north. Nasrallah promises the opposite: More Israelis will be displaced from their homes in northern Israel.

The notion that Hizbullahs communications are crippled is wishful thinking that fails to distinguish between what may be called civil-society Hizbullah, and its military arm.

Hizbullah is a civil movement, as well as a military power. It is the Authority over a significant slice of Beirut and a country - a responsibility that requires the Movement to provide civil order and security. The pagers and radios were used primarily by its civil security forces (effectively a civil police managing security and order in Hizbullah-controlled parts of Lebanon), as well as used by its logistics and support branches. Since these personnel are not combat forces, they were not seen to require truly secure communications.

Even before the 2006 war, Hizbullah ended all cellphone and landline communications in favour of their own dedicated optic cable system and hand-courier messaging for the military cadres. In short, Hizbullahs communications at the civil level took a major hit, but this will not unduly impact upon its military forces. For years, the Movement has operated on the basis that units could continue with combat, even in the event of a complete rupture of optic communications, or the loss of a HQ.

What comes next? Several scenarios are possible: The key is that Netanyahu is now back in "his comfort zone". The talk about hostages has subsided, and the plans for the stealth, calibrated expulsion of the Palestinian population are unfolding under the supervision of ministers Ben Gvir, Smotrich and others on the Right. Defence Minister Gallant has even declared military "victory" in Gaza.

And seems that Gallant too, has bowed to the inevitable: Netanyahu, it would seem, has got his way - bypassing Gallant and senior IDF officers objections to escalation versus Hizbullah, without having to sack the popular Gallant as defence minister, and without having to take in the troublesome Gideon Saar into his government!

Defence Minister Gallant, IDF chief Halevi and other IDF officials all issued statements on Wednesday evening which appeared to suggest a full-on war with Hizbullah was brewing, hours after the wave of explosions of communications devices across Lebanon.

From Netanyahus perspective, the United States - however grudgingly - is committed to supporting Israel in this war, and in a wider war, should Iran enter the fray. The United States hints its support is not open-ended, but Netanyahu probably counts on its engagement inexorably ratchetting up as events unfold, pulling the United States further in. (The Israel-supporting power-structures would never countenance any abandonment of an Israel in danger, in any case).

Judging by the statements out of Israel, the consensus is that Hizbullah will retaliate, but in a way that is different from the way it has responded until now. Will it make do with a limited response? That is unclear. But anything it does do could lead to an exchange of blows that, in turn, will precipitate a large-scale war.

Senior officials in the IDF and in other parts of the security establishment warn openly against "reckless steps being planned by their government in the north". On the one hand, these steps carry a very tangible danger of flaring up a general state of war, not only on the border with Lebanon, but in the entire region; and on the other hand, they do not promise a solution that will allow the residents of the north to return to their homes, or that the Gaza hostages will ever be released.

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