Bidens Last QUAD summit: All substance and no real Action by Salman Rafi Sheikh!
(2024-09-27 at 23:11:04 )

Bidens Last QUAD summit: All substance and no real Action by Salman Rafi Sheikh!

When Biden hosted the leaders of the Quadrilateral Security Group (QUAD) from India, Australia, and Japan in the United States in 2021, they did not directly mention China. Still, the emphasis on "shared security and prosperity" was an unmistakable reference to a joint mechanism to counter Beijings influence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly.

Bidens Last QUAD summit

One would have expected the Biden administration to leave a legacy of a significantly functional mechanism producing collective security and prosperity at the end of its era in 2024. But, as it turns out, QUAD remains where it was in 2021: a club that hosts little more than tea parties to mean anything. The club, as the Indian Prime Minister remarked after the latest summit, is "here to stay". The question, however, is: will it, or can it, turn into more than a club for occasional gatherings to talk about abstract geopolitics?

It is quite unlikely. Donald Trumps victory will dampen it even further. If Harris wins, she is unlikely to introduce any major changes from the Biden administration, for obvious reasons (she is currently part of the same administration!).

QUAD operates in a disconnected regional space as an abstract idea rather than as a force to be reckoned with

The Last Summit: What is new?

The last summit is, therefore, no different from the earlier ones insofar as it offers little more than a set of "commitments", and occasional references to "unity", "democracy" and certain joint ventures, such as Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI).

Apparently a new initiative, MAITRI is backed by little to nothing actionable and concrete. It aims to equip partner countries with "tools" that they will use "to monitor and secure their waters, enforce their laws, and deter unlawful behavior". Who will fund this initiative? What counts as "unlawful behaviour" and what exact action will be taken against those involved in any unlawful activity are some of the "black holes" that need massive filling before this initiative can qualify to acquire any geostrategic significance. There are other concerns too.

While the joint statement mentions China several times, it does not mention Russia at all. Although it refers to Ukraine, the fact that it does not refer to Russia is due to the nature of Indian ties with Moscow. What does this mean for the future of QUAD? No references to any threats other than those emerging from, or associated with, China leave QUAD a club squarely and singularly focused on China. Is this an advantage or a disadvantage?

The China Factor

Being squarely anti-China means QUAD can never sell itself to the wider region as a framework of security. Had QUAD been a general framework of security, it could have attracted several other countries from the region. However, it is unable to do this because a large number of countries in the region do not wish to gang up against China due to the nature of their ties with Beijing. For instance, there is probably not a single example where a country from this region, which is not a QUAD member, ever endorsed anything QUAD said or did. In other words, QUAD operates in a disconnected regional space as an abstract idea rather than as a force to be reckoned with.

This is despite the fact that the latest QUAD summit categorically said China is "testing us". Conversely, QUAD is "testing" China, but Chinas advantage is that it does not have many real regional rivals. That includes India too.

Now, PM Modi thinks that QUAD is here to stay, but the exact purpose it will serve for him is far from clear to other QUAD members. Consider the bilateral trade volume, for instance. It has already reached US$118 billion in 2024. Despite so-called "tensions", the overall trade grew by 1.5 per cent in terms of year-on-year growth. More significantly, QUAD downplays the role - and the possibility - of regional countries utilising bilateral channels for dispute resolution. Is QAUD the only mechanism that, for instance, PM Modi might depend upon in the wake of another border clash with China?

Bilateralism Trumps QUADs Multilateralism

Let us see what both India and China have done in the past two years. Instead of relying on QUAD, New Delhi happens to have preferred meetings and regular interaction with China at the Corps Commander level.

According to data shared by Indias Ministry of Home Affairs, 21 meetings have been held until February 2024. None of these meetings either involved any third party, nor did New Delhi stress a multilateral approach for "effective" dispute resolution. The Indian readout stressed the friendly and amicable nature of talks.

This is not the only mechanism. Since 2012, the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination (WMCC) on India-China Border Affairs has been another key bilateral avenue of dispute resolution, and it has remained relevant despite the border clashes. On August 29, the WMCC held its 31st meeting. The meetings aim was "to narrow down the differences and find early resolution of the outstanding issues".

Now, the emphasis on narrowing down existing differences not only signals success, but also the willingness to remain nonviolent in their approaches to conflict resolution. Nonviolence directly implies the irrelevance of the securitised approach of the QUAD vis-a-vis Chinas position in the Indo-Pacific.

There is, in simple words, a lesson for countries in the region. Many countries in Southeast Asia, for instance, have concerns about Chinas dominance in the South and East China seas. Should they opt for a military approach considering that India, a much bigger military power than any country in Southeast Asia, is itself following dialogue and diplomacy to resolve disputes? The lesson, in other words, is to emphasise bilateral approach and talk directly to China.

All of these factors combine to produce the utter inability of QUAD to evolve, since its establishment in 2004, as a significant military or economic alliance. Much to Washington,D.C.s disappointment, it still does not have a regional mechanism to "contain" China. Donald Trumps victory will dampen its prospects even further; while Ms Harris will operate in the same framework as the one outlined by Biden and Harris herself.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistans foreign and domestic affairs, exclusively for the online magazine "New Eastern Outlook".

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